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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In this consolidated appeal, Christopher Lee Lay appeals from judgments of
conviction for attempted strangulation, domestic battery in the presence of children, and
intimidating a witness, and persistent violator enhancements as to both felony
convictions, following a jury trial. On appeal, Mr. Lay asserts that his due process right
to notice of the charge against him was violated when the intimidating a witness
conviction was enhanced by a persistent violator finding because no documents were
ever filed notifying him that the State sought an enhancement as to that charge, and the
jury's verdict did not include a finding that he was a persistent violator as to the
intimidating a witness conviction.

He further asserts that the district court abused its

discretion when it declined to place him on probation following his convictions for
attempted strangulation and intimidating a witness. 1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This is a consolidated appeal from two cases in which Mr. Lay was charged in
one with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the presence of children,
along with a persistent violator enhancement, and in the other, with intimidating a
witness. (R., pp.37-38, 45-46, 239-40.) Following a jury trial on the criminal charges,
Mr. Lay was found guilty of attempted strangulation, misdemeanor domestic battery,
and intimidating a witness.

(Tr., p.349, L.10 - p.350, L.13.) After a jury trial on the

Mr. Lay has already served the sentence imposed for the misdemeanor domestic
battery conviction, thus rendering moot any claim that his sentence for that conviction
was excessive. As such, he does not pursue such a claim on appeal.
1

1

persistent violator enhancement, Mr. Lay was found to be a persistent violator "as
charged in Part II of the lnformation." 2 (Tr., p.368, L.11 - p.369, L.5; R., p.190.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested imposition of a unified sentence
of twenty years, with ten years fixed, for attempted strangulation, and a consecutive
indeterminate sentence of five years for intimidating a witness.

Defense counsel

requested a unified sentence of five years, with one year fixed, for attempted
strangulation, and an indeterminate sentence of three years for intimidating a witness,
and requested that both sentences be suspended in favor of probation.

(Tr., p.393,

Ls.6-10.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
five years fixed, for attempted strangulation, and a consecutive, indeterminate sentence
of five years for intimidating a witness. The district court declined to place Mr. Lay on
probation or to retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p.398, L.15 - p.400, L.10.) The judgments of
conviction indicate that Mr. Lay's sentence on each felony charge "was enhanced by the
persistent violator charge contained in the Information Part II." (R., pp.204, 389.)
Mr. Lay filed Notices of Appeal timely from the judgments of conviction.

(R.,

pp.211, 394.)

The only Information Part II contained in the record concerns the attempted
strangulation case. (R., pp.45-46.)
2
2

ISSUES
·1.

Was Mr. Lay's due process right to notice violated when he was found to be a
persistent violator with respect to the intimidating a witness conviction when the
State provided no notice of its intent to seek such an enhancement and the jury's
verdict did not include a finding that he was a persistent violator as to the
intimidating a witness conviction?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it declined to place Mr. Lay on
probation following his convictions for attempted strangulation and intimidating a
witness?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Lay's Due Process Right To Notice Was Violated When He Was Found To Be A
Persistent Violator With Respect To The Intimidating A Witness Conviction When The
State Provided No Notice Of Its Intent To Seek Such An Enhancement And The Jury's
Verdict Did Not Contain A Finding That He Was A Persistent Violator As To The
Intimidating A Witness Conviction
At the time of sentencing, the parties and the district court erroneously believed
that Mr. Lay had been found to be a persistent violator as to the intimidating a witness
conviction. However, neither an Information Part II nor any Amended Information was
ever filed in that case.

(R., pp.239-323.) Therefore, the jury's finding that he was a

persistent violator "as charged in Part II of the Information" (Tr., p.368, Ls.15-23; R.,
p. -190), can only have been said to have represented a finding as to the attempted
strangulation conviction. (R., pp.45-46 (Information Part II filed in District Court Case
No. CR-FE-2011-0017463).)
Furthermore, the Information Part II in the attempted strangulation case was filed
more than two weeks before the Information charging Mr. Lay with intimidating a
witness was filed.

(R., pp.45-46, 239-40.) As such, the finding that Mr. Lay was a

persistent violator with respect to the intimidating a witness charge, as noted at
sentencing (Tr., p.377, Ls.3-14), and set forth in the judgment of conviction (R., pp.38889), violated Mr. Lay's due process right to notice that the State was seeking such an
enhancement with respect to the intimidating a witness charge. See State v. Campbell,
114 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that Idaho Code § 19-2514 does not
require notice prior to any preliminary hearing, as it "requires notice only through an
allegation in the Information filed in district court"); State v. Haggard, 146 Idaho 37, 3940 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In order for a person to be sentenced as a persistent violator, the
4

prior convictions relied upon to invoke I.C. § 19-2514 must be alleged in the indictment
or information and proved at trial.") (citation omitted).

It is clear that Mr. Lay's due

process right to notice of the State's intent to seek a persistent violator enhancement as
to the intimidating a witness charge was violated, and that the jury's verdict did not
contain a finding that he was a persistent violator as to the intimidating witness
conviction.
While the sentence imposed did not exceed the non-enhanced maximum
sentence for intimidating a witness, 3 it is impossible to say from the record that the
erroneous persistent violator finding was harmless.

As the Idaho Court of Appeals

explained in State v. Clark, 132 Idaho 337 (Ct. App. 1998),
The persistent violator status carries with it a certain stigma and may
place pressure on the sentencing court to protect the public with a more
lengthy sentence, as well as on prison officials who may be reluctant to
grant parole. Therefore, a persistent violator finding will often cause
enhancement of the sentence imposed by the sentencing court and may
also defer one's parole status.

Clark, 132 Idaho at 340. The Court of Appeals went on to explain that, in light of the
fact "that the record is silent as to how the persistent violator finding was taken into
account by the district court in constructing the sente,nce" and its concerns about stigma
and pressure, it could not find the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 340-41. As in Clark, in Mr. Lay's case the record is silent as to how the district court
applied the erroneous persistent violator enhancement in constructing his sentence for
intimidating a witness.

3

Because no sentence is provided for in Idaho Code§ 18-2604 (intimidating a witness),
the maximum sentence is five years in prison. I.C. § 18-112 (providing that the
maximum sentence for a felony when no other penalty is prescribed by statute is five
·
years).

5

As such, Mr. Lay's sentence for intimidating a witness must be vacated, with this
matter remanded for resentencing without relying on the erroneous persistent violator
finding. In the alternative, if this Court finds any sentencing error to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, he respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for entry
of a corrected judgment of conviction deleting the erroneous persistent violator finding
with respect to the intimidating a witness conviction, so that the parole board does not
prevent Mr. Lay from being placed on parole due to the stigma associated with the
finding.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Declined To Place Mr. Lay On
Probation Following His Convictions For Attempted Strangulation And Intimidating A
Witness
Mr. Lay asserts that, given the mitigating factors present in his case, most
notably the express wishes of the victim, the district court abused its discretion when it
declined to place him on probation following his convictions for attempted strangulation
and intimidating a witness.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Lay does not allege that his sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion,
6

Mr. Lay must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id.
The most important mitigating factor in Mr. Lay's case is the fact that the victim
asked the district court not to sentence him to any term of incarceration. Specifically,
she pleaded with the district court to "let him out of his sentence and dismiss the no
contact order." (Tr., p.389, L.25 - p.390, L.6.) The people of Idaho thought that the
opinions and feelings of crime victims were so important that they granted them special
rights via an amendment to the Idaho Constitution. lo. CONST. ART. I, SEC. 22. Among
those rights are the right "[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, dignity, and privacy" and
the right "[t]o be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a
plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant." Id. The express
language of the amendment requires consideration of a victim's wishes prior to
imposing sentence, and that the victim be treated with respect by the courts. The failure
of the district court to give adequate consideration and respect to the express wishes of
the victim as to the appropriate sentence for Mr. Lay, namely one not involving
incarceration, was an abuse of discretion.
In addition to the victim's express wishes that Mr. Lay not serve a term of
incarceration, several other mitigating factors justify placing Mr. Lay on probation. First,
Mr. Lay acknowledged being addicted to drugs. (Tr., p.394, Ls.1-2.) Along these lines,
he explained, "I wish drugs and alcohol was [sic] never a part of my life." (PSI File, p.6.)
Second, he demonstrated maturity and accepted responsibility for his past performance
7

on probation and parole when he acknowledged that his previous "attempts ... were
not even close to satisfactory." (Tr., p.394, Ls.3-4.) Further support for his change in
perspective can be seen from the fact that, unlike during past incarcerations, he had no
disciplinary problems while incarcerated on the charges for which he was convicted in
this case, "indicating he has not presented a behavioral management problem." (PSI
File, pp.10-11.)
Additionally, Mr. Lay showed great insight when he requested that, as a condition
of the probation he requested, he not be allowed to be in a romantic relationship for at
least three years because "I don't really know what constitutes a healthy relationship."
(Tr., p.394, L.21 - p.395, L.3.) Mr. Lay is amenable to treatment, having explained, "I
think that relationship classes, parenting classes, stuff in that nature, domestic violence
classes would be great. And I'm all for it, Your Honor." (Tr., p.395, Ls.3-6.) Another
mitigating factor is that Mr. Lay had a chaotic childhood, during which time his mother
"struggled with drug addiction," resulting "in him spending his teenage years in foster
and group homes." One of his stepfathers was physically abusive, including "burn[ing]
us with lighters, break[ing] 2x4's over our butts" and "smash[ing] mine & my older
brother's heads together so hard I would see stars and have big knots on my head."
(PSI File, p.12.)

Finally, Mr. Lay enjoys the support of his family and friends, as

evidenced by a number of letters of support provided to the district court prior to
sentencing. (PSI File, pp.65-70.)
In light of the mitigating factors present in his case, most notably the express
wishes of the victim that he not be given a sentence of incarceration, the district court
abused its discretion when it declined to place Mr. Lay on probation following his
convictions for attempted strangulation and intimidating a witness.
8

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Lay respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the sentence imposed for intimidating a witness, enhanced based on an
erroneous persistent violator finding, and remand this matter to the district court for
resentencing without applying a persistent violator enhancement. Additionally, Mr. Lay
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with an order that his sentences
for attempted strangulation and intimidating a witness be suspended, and that he be
placed on probation for a period of ten years, with appropriate terms and conditions to
be determined by the district court on remand.

DATED this 2ih day of March, 2013.

SPENCERJ.HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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